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Digital sovereignty—the exercise of control over the internet—is the ambition of the world’s
leaders, from Australia to Zimbabwe, a bulwark against both foreign state and foreign
corporation. Governments have resoundingly answered first-generation internet law questions
of who if anyone should regulate the internet—they all will. We now confront second
generation questions—not whether, but how to regulate the internet. We argue that digital
sovereignty is simultaneously a necessary incident of democratic governance and democracy’s
dreaded antagonist. As international law scholar Louis Henkin taught us, sovereignty can
insulate a government’s worst ills from foreign intrusion. Assertions of digital sovereignty, in
particular, are often double-edged—useful both to protect citizens and to control them. Digital
sovereignty can magnify the government’s powers by making legible behaviors that were
previously invisible to the state. Thus, the same rule can be used to safeguard or repress--a feature
that legislators across the Global North and South should anticipate by careful checks and
balances.
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Introduction
The internet was supposed to end sovereignty. “Governments of the Industrial World,
you weary giants of flesh and steel, you have no sovereignty where we gather,” John Perry Barlow
famously declared.1 Sovereignty would prove impossible over a world of bits, with the internet
simply routing around futile controls.2 But reports of the death of sovereignty over the internet
proved premature. Consider just the last few months:
• On the eve of what was to be the world’s biggest initial public offering ever in
November 2020, the Chinese government scuttled the listing of fintech provider Ant
Group. Before the failed offering, Ant’s CEO, Jack Ma, had made what some saw as a
veiled critique of the government: “We shouldn’t use the way to manage a train station
to regulate an airport. … We cannot regulate the future with yesterday’s means.”3
Chastened after Beijing’s intervention, Ant announced that it would “embrace
regulation,” and Chinese netizens declared Jack Ma duly “tamed.”4
• In June 2021, France fined Google $593 million dollars for failing to follow an order to
negotiate with news publishers to compensate them for displaying snippets of news
items before linking.5 In July 2021, Luxembourg’s privacy regulator fined Amazon
$887 million for data protection violations.6 European Union (EU) authorities are
simultaneously investigating Google’s ad technology, Apple’s App Store, Facebook’s
Marketplace, and Amazon’s use of data from its third-party sellers.7 Even Facebook
1

See John P. Barlow, The Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER

FOUNDATION (July 16, 2021, 1:59 PM), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
As John Gilmore famously announced, “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”
See Philip Elmer-DeWitt & David S. Jackson, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 3,
1993, at 62.
3
See Lily Kuo, ‘Jack Ma Is Tamed’: How Beijing Showed Tech Entrepreneur Who Is Boss , GUARDIAN
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/nov/04/jack-ma-ant-group-is-tamedsocial-media-reacts-after-china-blocks-ipo.
2

4
5

3

Id.
See Gaspard Sebag, Google Told to Pay for News With Ultimatum and $593 Million Fine, BLOOMBERG

(July 13, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-13/google-said-to-be-fined-593million-by-french-antitrust-agency?sref=CrGXSfHu.
6
See Taylor Telford, E.U. regulator hits Amazon with record $887 million fine for data protection
violations,
WASH.
POST
(July
30,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/07/30/amazon-record-fine-europe/. The previous
highest fine issued by the Luxembourg data protection authority was 18,000 euros. GDPR Enforcement
Tracker, https://www.enforcementtracker.com/ (last visited, August 2, 2021, at 7:35 pm).
7
See Sam Schechner & Parmy Olson, Google Faces EU Antitrust Probe of Alleged Ad-Tech Abuses, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (June 22, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-faces-eu-antitrust-probe-ofalleged-ad-tech-abuses-11624355128; Natasha Lomas, Europe Charges Apple with Antitrust Breach,
Citing
Spotify
App
Store
Complaint,
TECH
CRUNCH
(Apr.
30,
2021),https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/30/europe-charges-apple-with-antitrust-breach-citing-spotifyapp-store-complaint/; Adam Satariano, Facebook Faces Two Antitrust Inquiries in Europe, NY TIMES

•

•
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Dating receives unwanted attention from the British competition authority.8
The technology giants are not safe even at home, as Ant discovered. In the home of
most of the world’s largest internet companies, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
seeks to compel Facebook to divest WhatsApp and Instagram, while investigating
Amazon for competing with merchants that use its platform.9 The federal government
and all but two U.S. states and are bringing antitrust claims against Google,10 and the
U.S. Justice Department is investigating Apple’s App Store.11
Assertions of digital sovereignty are hardly limited to Western nations. After Twitter
deleted tweets of its President that warned of a new civil war, the Nigerian government
in June 2021 simply banned Twitter from the country. On the eve of an election in
January 2021, Uganda had gone even further, ordering a complete shutdown of the
internet, with President Yoweri Museveni explaining that Facebook had deleted progovernment accounts as manipulative.12 Uganda followed the example of Zimbabwe,

(June 4, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/04/business/facebook-eu-uk-antitrust.html; Alina
Selyukh, Amazon Faces Antitrust Charges From European Regulators, NPR (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/10/879643610/amazon-faces-antitrust-charges-from-europeanregulators.
8
See U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, CMA investigates Facebook’s use of ad data, June 4, 2021,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-investigates-facebook-s-use-of-ad-data.
9
Federal Trade Commission, FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology
Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftcs-bureaucompetition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology (tech in general and the FTC); Factbox: How Big
Tech Is Faring Against U.S. Lawsuits and Probes, REUTERS (July 13, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/big-tech-wins-two-battles-fight-with-us-antitrust-enforcers2021-06-29/; See Brent Kendall, Amazon Seeks Recusal of FTC Chairwoman Lina Khan in Antitrust
Investigations
of
Company,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(June
30,
2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-seeks-recusal-of-ftc-chairwoman-lina-khan-in-antitrustinvestigations-of-company-11625067962 (Amazon).
10
See Department of Justice, Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google For Violating Antitrust Laws
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violatingantitrust-laws (Google); Rachel Lerman & Marcy Gordon, States Led by Texas Target Google in New
Antitrust Probe, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/texas-district-ofcolumbia-ne-state-wire-ap-top-news-social-platforms-b9d35b1e07b14f3b923c35e7778295ee (fifty U.S.
states and territories suing Google); Matt O’Brien, Big Tech Faces a New Set of Foes: Nearly All 50 US
States, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/business-district-of-columbiaus-news-ap-top-news-ut-state-wire-8fae76b9b37d473caff2c94a59029a57.
11
See Leah Nylen, Apple’s Easy Ride From U.S. Authorities May Be Over, POLITICO (June 24, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/24/justice-department-anti-trust-apple-337120
(Apple);
Factbox: How Big Tech Is Faring Against U.S. Lawsuits and Probes, REUTERS (July 13, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/big-tech-wins-two-battles-fight-with-us-antitrust-enforcers2021-06-29/.
12
See Stephen Kafeero, Uganda Has Cut Off Its Entire Internet Hours to Its Election Polls Opening,
QUARTZ AFRICA (Jan. 13, 2021), https://qz.com/africa/1957137/uganda-cuts-off-internet-ahead-ofelection-polls-opening/.

which had responded to anti-government protests in 2019 by shuttering the internet.13
The state (both nation-state as well as nearly every U.S. state) strikes back.14
Scholars are sharply divided about the increasing assertion of what is called variously
“data sovereignty” or “digital sovereignty.”15 Some scholars see it as a natural extension of
traditional Westphalian sovereignty to the twenty-first century.16 They are joined by other
scholars, often from the Global South, who support data sovereignty in order to repulse imperial
ambitions for data colonialism, a barricade against the exploitative and extractive practices of
Western (and Chinese) technology giants.17 Other scholars, however, worry that data
sovereignty will break the web apart, jeopardizing its numerous global benefits.18 As Mark
Lemley astutely laments, “The news you see, the facts you see, and even the maps you see change
depending on where you are.”19
We recognize the importance of digital sovereignty to protect privacy, ensure consumer
protection, promote competition, and enable law enforcement. Developing countries should
indeed seek to ensure that the digital economy does not leave them behind. However, even as
scholars understandably seek to protect individual rights through digital sovereignty, they often
neglect the critique that sovereignty can insulate human rights abuses from outside scrutiny.
Away with the “S-word,” the preeminent human rights theorist Louis Henkin cautioned.20 We
argue that Henkin’s concern is even graver with respect digital sovereignty, which presents
greater risk of totalitarian control. While digital sovereignty may well be a geopolitical necessity
in opposition to both foreign governments and foreign corporations, digital sovereignty also
allows a government to assert enormous powers over one’s own citizens, and thus deserves
See Zimbabwe Imposes Internet Shutdown Amid Crackdown on Protests, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/18/zimbabwe-imposes-internet-shutdown-amid-crackdownon-protests.
14
For a round-up of some recent enforcement actions faced by the biggest technology companies, see Joe
Panettieri, Big Tech Antitrust Investigations: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google Updates ,
CHANNELE2E (July 13, 2021), https://www.channele2e.com/business/compliance/big-tech-antitrustregulatory-breakup-updates/.
15
We explore various definitions of the terms in Part I, A below.
16
See, e.g., Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 366-71 (2018) (arguing
that we should “embrace [] sovereign differences” rather than opt for a single set of rules everywhere).
17
See Renata Avila Pinto, Digital Sovereignty or Digital Colonialism, 27 SUR - INT'L J. ON HUM RTS. 15
(2018); Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, Data Colonialism: Rethinking Big Data’s Relation to the
Contemporary Subject, 20 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 336, 337 (2019). Cf. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN
TRUTH AND POWER THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 51 (2019)
(noting the distributive nature of the construction of a “biopolitical public domain,” where raw data is a
resource to be processed).
18
See Mark A. Lemley, The Splinternet, 70 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1427 (2021) (“[W]e should fight hard not to
give up the internet for an information superhighway, particularly one that's controlled by our national
governments.”).
19
Id. at 1409.
20
See Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, et Cetera, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11 (1999) (observing that he “use[s] the word only to stop using it”).
13
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exacting scrutiny. We call this the double-edged sword of digital sovereignty: digital sovereignty
both enables the protection of residents, and their control.
The ongoing tech wars between the U.S. and China, as our article shows, epitomize the
double-edged sword of digital sovereignty. In 2020, the Trump Administration issued a series
of executive orders that had the effect of banning TikTok’s and WeChat’s operations in the U.S.
on national security grounds.21 While dealing with potential threats posted by China’s collection
of data through these platforms, the government turned a blind eye to the serious harm its orders
had caused to speech protection.22 The upshot was that more than 100 million U.S. users23
would have been muted on TikTok, a digital platform crucial for social activities during the
COVID-19 pandemic and for politics on the eve of an election.24 American courts reacted to
the dark side of the U.S. government’s assertions of digital sovereignty. It enjoined those
sweeping orders against TikTok and WeChat, because they “burden[ed] substantially more
speech than is necessary to serve the government's significant interest in national security.”25
Our article is the first comprehensive account of digital or data sovereignty.26 We survey
the various ways in which states are asserting digital sovereignty. We argue that digital
21

See Anupam Chander, Protecting the Global Internet from Technology Cold Wars, COMMUNICATIONS

OF THE ACM (forthcoming 2021).
22

6

See Eva Galperin et al., TikTok Ban: A Seed of Genuine Security Concern Wrapped in a Thick Layer of
Censorship, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.eff.org/zh-

hant/deeplinks/2020/08/tiktok-ban-seed-genuine-security-concern-wrapped-thick-layer-censorship
(“Banning Americans from using the TikTok app would infringe the First Amendment rights of those
users to express themselves online.”); Gregg Leslie, TikTok and the First Amendment, SLATE (Sept. 29,
2020),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/tiktok-wechat-first-amendment-free-speech.html
(arguing that "the First Amendment should save TikTok [and WeChat]"); Shelly Banjo & Misyrlena
Egkolfopoulou, TikTok Teens Try To Trick Trump Campaign, Again, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-09/tiktok-teens-try-to-trick-trump-campaignagain (reporting that users “believe Trump is trying to take TikTok away because of national security, but
more to retaliate against activism on the app and all the videos about him that drag him through the
mud”).
23
Alex Sherman, TikTok Reveals Detailed User Numbers for the First Time, CNBC (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-reveals-us-global-user-growth-numbers-for-first-time.html
(“More than 100 million Americans are monthly active users today, the company said earlier this month.
The company also revealed it has more than 50 million daily U.S. users.”).
24
See Taylor Lorenz, This Is Why You Heard About TikTok So Much in 2020, NY TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/style/tiktok-trends-2020.html (discussing how TikTok
transformed business, entertainment, news, activism and social connection in 2020); Jana Feldkamp, The
Rise of TikTok: The Evolution of a Social Media Platform During COVID-19, in DIGITAL RESPONSES
TO COVID-19 73-85 (Hovestadt C., Recker J., Richter J., Werder K. eds., 2021).
25
U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al. , No. 3:20-cv-05910-LB, at 18 (N.D. Cal.
Sep. 19, 2020). See also, TikTok Inc., et al., v. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., No.
1:20-cv-02658-CJN (Opinion) (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2020).
26
Cf. Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328 (2018) (arguing that national
attempts to regulate the global cloud are legitimate, and can be reasonably disciplined through judicial

sovereignty is not merely a twenty-first century extension of traditional sovereignty, necessary
to discipline the corporations that have enormous power in our lives, but that also that digital
sovereignty is especially susceptible to hijacking by abusive governments.
Our argument helps explain a puzzling feature of discussions of digital sovereignty:
observers generally welcome digital sovereignty efforts by governments in the Global North, but
deplore such efforts by governments in the Global South.27 In the former case, digital
sovereignty is recognized as the government protecting citizens—either from foreign
governments or corporations. In the latter case, digital sovereignty is seen as the government
hijacking the internet to protect itself. This is true across a range of issues, from content
moderation, to data privacy, to data localization, to national security. The double-edged nature
of digital sovereignty also means that we sometimes see only the negative end of digital
regulations. The American government, academic, and media have rightly observed how the
Chinese government’s assertions of digital sovereignty beefed up its political control and
trampled on human rights through measures such as Internet filtering, digital surveillance, and
data misuse. This sometimes means that we fail to recognize aspects of these laws that protect
citizen’s rights. Notably, China has been actively protecting citizens’ data privacy rights through
waves of legislative proposals, regulatory measures, and judicial decisions (though we point out
dangers in this exercise below28).
Our argument exposes a difficulty in one popular framing of digital sovereignty as an
effort to thwart Chinese technology dominance on the grounds that Chinese technology
inherently promotes greater authoritarian controls. We agree that technologies are never

7

doctrines of sovereign deference); Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018) (;
Luciano Floridi, The Fight for Digital Sovereignty: What It Is, and Why It Matters, Especially for the EU,
33 Philosophy & Technology 369, 375 (2020) (arguing that “the best answer to the multinationals’
control of the digital is probably the establishment of a (de jure and not only a possibly de facto)
supranational digital sovereignty, at the EU level”); Theodore Christakis, “European Digital Sovereignty”:
Successfully Navigating Between the “Brussels Effect” and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy ,
Studies on Internet Governance, https://cesice.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/actualites/2020-12-15/europeandigital-sovereignty-successfully-navigating-between-brussels-effect-and-europe-s-quest.
27
For example, when India ordered MasterCard to stop issuing new cards in the country because of a failure
to comply with requirements to store the data in India, reports in the media criticized the curb as
“egregious.” See Andy Mukherjee, Sorry, No Mastercard? Digital Trade Needs Rules, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (July 15, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-07-15/india-s-dataclampdown-on-mastercard-shows-need-for-biden-digital-trade-deal. Similar concerns about the transfer
of data abroad, when raised in Europe, have often been seen as privacy protective (whether justified or
not). Hong Kong recently real-name SIM card registration introduced to much alarm. But real-name SIM
card registration is already a feature in some 155 countries, including Australia, France, and Germany. See
A List of Mandatory ‘real name’ prepaid SIM card registration Country?, BUZZSIM,
https://buzzsim.com/mandatory-real-name-registration-for-prepaid-sim-card-in-different-countries/;
Timeline of SIM Card Registration Laws, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3018/timeline-sim-card-registration-laws.
28
See infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text.

neutral29—that they can be more or less adaptable for authoritarian purposes. However, this
framing of an ethical North vs. and unethical South obscures the fact that regulatory systems
everywhere have to be better prepared for the abuses of technology by governments keen on
maintaining their power. The recent revelations of the widespread use by countries in Europe
and across the world of Western surveillance provider NSO spyware dramatize this concern.30
There is no need for a government to adopt Chinese technologies,31 if you can buy your spyware
off the shelf from Western suppliers.
We argue here for digital sovereignty, but within a system of checks and balances, and
limited to protect the virtues of the global internet. Digital sovereignty is both necessary and
dangerous. It is both merely an incident to popular sovereignty, and its bête noire.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the emergence of Sovereignty, 2.0. Part
II observes the unique characteristics of this new twenty-first century sovereignty. Part III
explores the double-edged sword of digital sovereignty through recent regulatory interventions.
I.

From Hobbes to Zuckerberg: The Rise of Digital Sovereignty

When Thomas Hobbes imagined an “Artificiall Man” in the form of a state,32 he was
not picturing Facebook. But the reality is that modern leviathans like Facebook and Google, and
even Reddit and Twitter, exercise enormous power over our lives. Increasingly, governments
across the world have sought to bring these companies under their control. While China
pioneered data sovereignty, it is now the demand of governments from Australia to Zimbabwe.
The era of countries unsure whether they had the power to regulate the internet is over.
After defining digital sovereignty, we review below the effort to attain data sovereignty
in a few key jurisdictions. Our review reveals at least three different motivations for assertions of
data sovereignty. First, governments demand digital sovereignty to better protect their
population—seeking, for example, to remove material deemed illegal under their laws or to
protect the rights of citizens in the digital domain. This often takes the form of regulating foreign
corporations that intermediate data flows for the local population. Second, governments seek
digital sovereignty in an effort to grow their own digital economy, sometimes by displacing
foreign corporations, from fintech to social media. Third, governments seek digital sovereignty
to better control their populations—to limit what they can say, read, or do.

See Anupam Chander & Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of Platform Neutrality, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
400 (2018).
30
See infra notes 205-219 and accompanying text.
31
See Paul Mozur et al., Made in China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State, NY TIMES (Apr.
24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-policegovernment.html.
32
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm
(“[A]s men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall
Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes,
which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or
Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears.”).
29
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A.

Defining “Digital Sovereignty”

At first glance, the term “sovereignty” over parts of the internet may seem entirely out
of place. After all, one of the prerequisites for the recognition of the sovereignty of a state in
international law is the exercise of power over a territory.33 Andrew Woods grounds his
definition of “data sovereignty” in three core elements of state sovereignty: “(1) supreme
control; (2) over a territory; (3) independent from other sovereigns.”34 The tension between the
notion of “digital sovereignty” and the territorial foundation for sovereignty disappears when
we recognize that in order to exercise control over any territory, it is increasingly necessary to
exercise control over the online activities available in that territory. This insight connects place
and cyberspace.
Woods writes that, in order to control data within their borders to the exclusion of
other states, “states can command considerable control over the internet if only because they
control the physical components of the network within their borders” through “an impressive
arsenal of tools.”35 Dan Svantesson rightly observes that sovereignty should not have to be allor-nothing, and so perhaps Woods’ requirement of exclusivity is unnecessarily strict for a claim
of data sovereignty.36 For Woods, a state’s data sovereignty powers include powers to compel
compliance (“leav[ing] companies and their users free to design and use the internet as they see
fit, as long as they comply when the government comes knocking”) and powers to control the
means of compliance (“the state tells internet firms how to operate”).37 It seems clear that
multiple states are able to order the same firm how to operate, with occasional conflicts in
approaches.38
Ke Xu divides sovereignty in cyberspace into three layers: physical layer (sovereignty
over physical internet infrastructure and activities), the code layer (sovereignty over domain
names, internet standards, and regulations), and the data layer.39
Like Hobbes, Luciano Floridi begins by theorizing individual sovereignty, which he
defines in twenty-first century terms as “self-ownership, especially over one’s own body, choices,
and data,”40 and then extends this to “digital sovereignty,” which he defines as the “control of
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States provides as follows: “The state
as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”
34
Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328, 360 (2018).
35
Id. at 360-361.
36
Dan Svantesson, A Starting Point for Re-thinking ‘Sovereignty’ for the Online Environment (draft on
file with author).
37
Woods, supra note 34, at 364.
38
One prominent dispute involving a possible conflict—the Microsoft dispute with the U.S. authorities
over data held in Ireland --did not create a hard conflict of laws because Ireland did not explicitly claim
that transferring the data to the U.S. would be illegal under Irish law.
39
Ke Xu, Data Security Law: Location, Position and Institution Construction, 3 BUS. & ECON. L. REV. 57
(2019).
40
Luciano Floridi, The Fight for Digital Sovereignty: What It Is, and Why It Matters, Especially for the EU,
33 PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 369, 371 (2020).
33
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data, software (e.g. AI), standards and protocols (e.g. 5G, domain names), processes (e.g. cloud
computing), hardware (e.g. mobile phones), services (e.g. social media, e-commerce), and
infrastructures (e.g. cables, satellites, smart cities).”41
Data sovereignty, as argued by Paul Rosenzweig, may also be framed as a question:
which sovereign controls the data?42 The core issue is one of jurisdiction, which is, of course,
complicated by the borderless nature of the internet.43 “In short, the question is: ‘Whose law is
to be applied?”44 Rosenzweig argues that physical location is, as a practical matter, critical:
“Where the servers are and where the data is stored will, in the end, likely control whose law
applies. As they say, ‘geography is destiny.’”45 Certainly, the physical control over the network
made possible through internet service providers that route data is a key to digital sovereignty,
at least where foreign corporations do not comply on other grounds.
We will use the term “digital sovereignty” to mean the application of traditional state
sovereignty over the online domain, 46 or simply “sovereignty in a digital age.”47 Digital
sovereignty should be defined broadly to cover a state’s sovereign power to regulate not only
cross-border flow of data through uses of internet filtering technologies and data localization
mandates, but also speech activities (e.g. combating fake news) and access to technologies. We
use the term interchangeably with “data sovereignty” because a distinction between dominion
over “data” and dominion over the “digital” is hard to maintain. We use the term in a descriptive
way, to describe efforts by governments to assert control over online activities, often instantiated
through actions targeted at internet intermediaries. Notably, academics and news media are
more likely to speak in terms of “data sovereignty” than “digital sovereignty,” as a search of the
database ProQuest shows:48
Data Sovereignty Digital Sovereignty
Academic
Other
Academic
Other
2019-2021
271
1378
44
731

41
42

405, 421 (2012).
See id.
44
Id. at 422.
45
Id.
46
This accords with the French Senate investigatory committee report, which defines digital sovereignty as
the “capacity of the state to act in cyberspace.” LE DEVOIR DE SOUVERAINETÉ NUMÉRIQUE :NI
RÉSIGNATION,
NI
NAÏVETÉ,
http://www.senat.fr/fileadmin/Fichiers/Images/redaction_multimedia/2019/2019_Infographies/2019
1004_infog_Souverainete_numerique_021019.pdf (Oct. 2019).
47
Paul Timmers, Challenged by “Digital Sovereignty,” 23 (6) J. INTERNET L. 1, 18 (2019).
48
This search run on ProQuest on July 16, 2021 updates an analysis by Stephane Couture & Sophie
Toupin, What Does the Notion of “Sovereignty” Mean When Referring to the Digital?, 21 NEW MEDIA
& SOCIETY 2305, 2306 (2019). Note that the “other” category includes newspapers, trade journals,
magazines, reports, blogs, books, and working papers.
43
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Id. at 370-371.
See Paul Rosenzweig, The International Governance Framework for Cybersecurity, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J.

B.

China: Inventing Digital Sovereignty

In the mid-1990s, when the world started coming online, China’s Ministry of Public
Security inaugurated its “Golden Shield Project,” 金盾工程 — “a far-ranging attempt to
harness emerging information technologies for policing.”49 Henry Gao observes that Chinese
digital sovereignty evolved through different phases—physical controls, and then controls over
the software layer and content.50 In other words, it went up the internet stack. As James Fallows
writes in a classic Western account of “the Great Firewall of China,” “In China, the Internet
came with choke points built in.”51 China takes a multifaceted approach to exerting digital
sovereignty, which includes controlling its physical infrastructure, regulating content, balancing
negative economic impacts, and building international support for its conception of data
sovereignty.52 The most prominent aspect of China’s physical infrastructure innovation is the
“Great Firewall,” which is used by the government to block access to content for users in
China.53 However, sometimes the firewall causes collateral impact on internet freedom beyond
China’s borders through DNS pollution, which blocks access to websites by users in other
countries by inadvertently impeding their traffic.54
In 2010, the Chinese State Council officially declared its support for “Internet
sovereignty” (wangluo zhuquan or 网络主权) in a white paper entitled “The Internet in
China.” The white paper declared, “Within Chinese territory the Internet is under the
jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and
protected.”55 The link to territoriality seems to be both a nod to international law and also part
of a long-standing Chinese Communist Party official approach to international relations that
pledged non-interference in internal affairs.56 In 2015, President Xi explained that “respecting
cyber-sovereignty” meant “respecting each country’s right to choose its own internet
development path, its own internet management model, its own public policies on the internet,

Lorand Laskai, Nailing Jello to the Wall, in JANE GOLLEY, LINDA JAIVIN, & LUIGI TOMBA, CONTROL 192,
194 (2017).
50
Henry Gao, Data Regulation with Chinese Characteristics, in Mira Burri (ed.), Big Data and Trade 245,
248 (2021) (noting that 1996 and 1997 Chinese “regulations all focused on the Internet hardware,” while
attention was paid later to software and content).
51
James Fallows, The Connection Has Been Reset, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2008),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/the-connection-has-been-reset/306650/.
52
Anqi Wang, Cyber Sovereignty at Its Boldest: A Chinese Perspective, 16 Ohio St. Tech. L.J. 395, 403
(2020); http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2010-06/08/content_20207978.htm.
53
See id. at 408, 439.
54
See id. at 408, 439-41.
55
See id. at 399.
56
See Anupam Chander, The Asian Century?, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 727 (2011) (noting the Five
Principles for Peaceful Coexistence, including “mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs”).
49
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and to participate on an equal basis in the governance of international cyberspace —avoiding
cyber-hegemony, and avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”57
China has escalated the tech cold war in 2021. The Cybersecurity Administration of
China opened investigations into the data transfer practices of Chinese tech giant Didi
immediately following that company’s New York Stock Exchange listing. It then ordered Didi
removed from Chinese app stores.58 Even though Didi’s stock price plummeted, Chinese media
celebrated the “rise of data sovereignty.”59
China’s conception of digital sovereignty is rooted, Anqi Wang writes, in traditional
notions of territorial sovereignty60 and officially justified by concern for national and ideological
security.61 China supports to a “state-centric multilateralism” model of internet governance, 62
which holds that states, not private sector actors like ICANN, should be driving internet
governance.63 In contrast, the “bottom-up multi-stakeholderism” subscribed to by the US and
other Western countries64 holds that the private sector and civil society should remain key
players in internet governance.65 Western “information freedom” approach to the internet66 is
perceived as a threat to “Chinese ideological security” and a tool of cultural imperialism.67 The
Chinese government instead seeks to use the internet to consolidate party control, maintain
social order and proliferate desirable socialist and Confucian values such as “‘patriotism,’
‘loyalty to the communist party,’ ‘dedication to one's work,’ ‘honesty,’ [and] ‘filial piety,’” to
See id. at 397; Franz-Stefan Gady, The Wuzhen Summit and the Battle over Internet Governance,
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 14, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-wuzhen-summit-and-the-battleover-internet-governance/; Bruce Sterling, Respecting Chinese and Russian Cyber-Sovereignty In The
Formerly Global Internet, WIRED (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.wired.com/beyond-thebeyond/2015/12/respecting-chinese-and-russian-cyber-sovereignty-in- the-formerly-global-internet/.
58
See Jacky Wong, Didi and the Big Chill on China’s Big Data, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 5, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/didi-and-the-big-chill-on-chinas-big-data-11625479452.
59
See Li Qiaoyi & Hu Yuwei, Chinese Regulator Orders App Stores to Remove Didi, Shows Resolve to
Enhance
Data
Protection,
GLOBAL
TIMES
(July
4,202),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1227778.shtml ("Ride-hailing firms manage large amounts
of data regarding national transport infrastructure, flows of people and vehicles, among other types of
information that involve national security, according to Dong. The rise of ‘data sovereignty’ versus the
US government's vigilance against Chinese firms ought to be a wake-up call for national security
awareness to be given priority when it comes to fundraising plans in areas that might pose threats to
China's national security, Dong told the Global Times on Sunday.”).
60
See Wang, supra note 52, at 397.
61
See id. at 424 (explaining China views cybersecurity as another national security domain alongside land,
sea, air, and space).
62
See id. at 443-44.
63
See id. (explaining that China opposes the current system where a US corporation, ICANN (Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), controls root ownership).
64
See id. at 399.
65
See id. at 444.
66
See id. at 400.
67
See id. at 406.
57
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“develop a cohesive, socialist nation.”68 President Xi affirmed this vision in 2016, stating, “we
must ... strengthen positive online propaganda, foster a positive, healthy, upward and
benevolent online culture, use the Socialist core value view and the excellent civilizational
achievements of humankind to nourish people's hearts and nourish society.”69
China sees US internet infrastructure hegemony as a threat to its digital sovereignty.70
In 2016, President Xi stated, “the fact that [the internet’s] core technology is controlled by
others is our greatest hidden danger.”71 Accordingly, the government has been investing heavily
in research and development of internet technology72 and “territorializing critical
infrastructure”73 to escape Western technical and physical network dependence. Part of this
effort has been a proliferation of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) regulations,74
including data localization regulations through the 2017 Cybersecurity Law (CSL).75 Not only
does Article 37 of the CSL require that data and personal information originating in China be
stored within China, critical information infrastructure operators must also undergo “security
assessments” before that data can be transferred abroad.76 (We describe later the first such
security assessment—against the ride-hailing company Didi.77)
Content regulation and censorship is another integral component of China’s
“information sovereignty” on the internet.78 Though China’s approach to content regulation is
more extreme than other countries,79 it rejects accusations that cyber sovereignty policies simply
mask authoritarian control.80 Instead, the government claims to censor “subversive,” “harmful,”

68
69

See id. at 407.
Xi Jinping gives speech at Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference, CHINA COPYRIGHT
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(Apr. 19, 2016), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/04/19/xi-jinpinggives-speech-at-cybersecurity-and-informatization-work-conference/.
70
See Wang, supra note 52, at 404-05 (explaining that China perceives US corporate and civil society control
over domain names and US-made infrastructure as favoring US interests).
71
See id. at 405.
72
See id. at 434, 436.
73
See id. at 434.
74
See id. at 436-37.
75
See id. at 408, 456.
76
See id. at 456-57; Willem Gravett, Digital Neo-Colonialism: The Chinese Model of Internet Sovereignty
in Africa, 20 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 125, 130 (2020) (data on Chinese users must be hosted on Chinese
mainland); Reed Smith, Cross-Border Data Transfers: CSL vs. GDPR (January 2, 2018),
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2018/01/cross-border-data-transfer-csl-vs-gdpr; Samm
Sacks, China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect, LAWFARE BLOG (June 1, 2017, 10:56
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-what-expect.
77
See infra notes 183-189 and accompanying text.
78
See Wang, supra note 52, at 452.
79
See id. at 466.
80
See id. at 416.

“obscene,” or “malicious” content while welcoming “kind criticism.”81 Content control remains
a clear goal. In 2017, the Cyber Administration of China (CAC) asserted that “Online positive
publicity must become bigger and stronger, so that the Party's ideas always become the strongest
voice in cyberspace.”82 The Theoretical Studies Center Group of CAC also commented in
Qiushi that “[w]e must ... steadily control all kinds of major public opinion; dare to grasp, dare
to control, and dare to wield the bright sword; refute erroneous ideas in a timely manner” to
“prevent mass incidents and public opinion from becoming online ideological patterns and
issues.”83
Some of the measures China takes to regulate content and maintain a “clear
cyberspace”84 include blocking VPN access, algorithms that divert searches, the Real Name
Registration Policy,85 and making domain name service providers responsible for content by
their clients through a 2017 update to Article 28 of the Measures for the Administration of
Internet Domain Names Law. 86 However, standards for what information is “erroneous” or in
violation of the law remain unclear.87 The government also introduced an “Interview
Mechanism” which functions as a warning to websites and companies hosting prohibited
content before sanctions, fines, or criminal prosecutions are pursued.88 Such interviews
incentivize self-correction and willing removal of censored content by allowing websites to stay
up and avoid fines or harsher penalties like closure.89
Through its “Digital Silk Road,” which adopts one of the authors’ framing of the
internet as the “Electronic Silk Road,”90 China has sought to advance its digital trade
connections with developing countries across the word. This part of China’s Belt and Road
Initiative promotes collaboration between China and developing countries in critical internet
infrastructure projects, e-commerce, and AI.91 By increasing developing African and Eurasian
nations’ internet access,92 as well as their dependence on Chinese technology, China acquires
President Xi commented that “to build a well-functioned Internet public sphere is not to censor all
negative comments and only endorse a single perspective; it is to welcome, investigate, and learn lessons
from the kind criticism but reject those comments which turn things upside down, mix the black with
the white, spread rumors with malicious intentions, commit crimes and override the Constitution.” Id.
at 416, 422.
82
Elsa Kania et al., China’s Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyberspace, NEW AMERICA (Sept. 25,
2017), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-strategic-thinking-buildingpower-cyberspace; Wang, supra note 52, at 453; see also Gravett, supra note 76, at 131.
83
See Wang, supra note 52, at 456.
84
See id. at 455.
85
See id. at 456; Gravett, supra note 76, at 130 (describing a 2017 law that makes social media companies
register users with their real names).
86
See Wang, supra note 52, at 458.
81
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See id.
See id. at 461, 464.
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See id.
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ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD (2013).
See id. at 441.
92
See id. at 417.
90
91

soft power, while creating new markets for Chinese technology exports and e-commerce.93
Many Western governments have expressed concern that China’s grip on developing nations’
internet infrastructure could leave them vulnerable to possible surveillance by either China or
local governments.94 Thus, even as the Chinese government worries about foreign influences via
the internet, many other governments worry about the Chinese government. China looms
especially large in the geopolitics that are driving many assertions of digital sovereignty.
C.

The EU: Embracing Digital Sovereignty

Nowhere have calls for digital sovereignty been more intense than Europe. As early as
2006, President Jacques Chirac of France called on Europeans to develop an indigenous
information search capacity to respond to “the global challenge posed by Google and Yahoo.”95
As early as 2010, the French government was sounding the alarm about the loss of sovereignty
in the face of foreign technology firms. François Fillon, then Prime Minister, observed that with
respect to cloud computing, “North Americans dominate this market, which nevertheless
constitutes an absolutely major stake for the competitiveness of our economies, for sustainable
development and even, I dare say it, for the sovereignty of our countries.”96 Among the strategies
the government adopted was the promotion of “le cloud souverain”—the “sovereign cloud”-through partnerships with cloud computing enterprises to support domestic employment,
among other goals.97 In 2013, the French government detailed efforts to “build a France of
digital sovereignty,” including the desire to make to “make France the world leader” in the field
of “Big Data.”98
See id. at 447; Gravett, supra note 76, at 131 (international consensus building).
See Wang, supra note 52, at 441.
95
Chander, supra note 90, at 40.
96
Pierre Noro, Le Cloud Souverain Est De Retour: Généalogie D’une Ambition Emblématique De La
Souveraineté Numérique En France, SCIENCESPO: CHAIRE DIGITAL, GOUVERNANCE ET
93
94
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(Jul.
20,
2020),
https://www.sciencespo.fr/public/chairenumerique/2020/07/20/cloud-souverain-genealogie-ambition-emblematique-souverainete-numerique/
(speech by Prime Minister François Fillon on broadband and the digital economy, January 18, 2010).
97
The French government then invested in two French cloud projects. See Delphine Cuny, "Cloud“ à la
française : Fleur Pellerin justifie les deux projets concurrents, LA TRIBUNE (Oct. 2, 2012),
https://www.latribune.fr/technos-medias/informatique/20121002trib000722485/cloud-a-la-francaisefleur-pellerin-justifie-les-deux-projets-concurrents.html. Germany too has pursued a similar data
sovereignty strategy by establishing local cloud centers for the storage of government information. See
Andrew D. Mitchell & Jarrod Hepburn, Don’t Fence Me In: Reforming Trade and Investment Law to
Better Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfer, 19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 182, 189 (2017).
98
See MINISTÈRE DU REDRESSEMENT PRODUCTIF [MINISTRY OF ECON.
REGENERATION], THE NEW FACE OF INDUSTRY IN FRANCE 51 (2013), available at
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/nouvelle_france_industrielle_english.pdf
[hereinafter NEW
FACE OF INDUSTRY] (cited in Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J.
677, 690-1 (2015)). President François Hollande announced the national innovation program on
September 12, 2013, with a plan that used the term “sovereignty” no less than a dozen times. See Nicholas

EU digital sovereignty has been expressed perhaps most fully through a robust assertion
of data protection law. The EU’s data protection law covers companies based in the EU, but
also foreign companies that target the EU residents and process information about them. This
has made the EU into an internet regulatory superpower.99
The German government announced in July 2020 that it would “establish digital
sovereignty as a leitmotiv of European digital policy.”100 The European Commission similarly
declared its intention to “strengthen its digital sovereignty and set standards, rather than
following those of others.”101
D.

Russia: Promoting the Runet

Russia has embraced digital sovereignty as official policy, even seeking to create an
entirely separable Russian internet, dubbed the “Runet.” This reflects a u-turn in policy early
years when the Russian government embraced the internet as a means to transform the country
from reliance on natural resources. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Russian government
began to assert greater control of the internet, recognizing the internet’s demonstrated potential
to help bring down governments.102 Today, Russia’s official policy is to create a “sovereign
Runet”—a Russian internet where the Russian government exercises “more control over what
its citizens can access.”103 In 2019, Vladimir Putin signed the “Sovereign Internet” bill into law,
gaining broad powers to monitor and control traffic on the Russian internet through hardware
and software controls installed in Russian telecommunications infrastructure, and even to
restrict the global internet in certain cases.104 Ironically, given Russian prolific interventions in
elections abroad, Russian demands for a sovereign internet are driven in part by claims of
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2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/france-industry/hollande-turns-to-robots-driverless-cars-torevive-french-industry-idUSL5N0H73T020130912.
99
ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT (noting that “the EU remains an influential superpower that
shapes the world in its image”); Anupam Chander, Margot Kaminski, & William McGeveran, Catalyzing
Privacy, MINN. L. REV. (2020)
100
Together for Europe’s recovery: Programme for Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the EU 2020,
at 8 (2020)., https://www.eu2020.de/blob/2360248/978a43ce17c65efa8f506c2a484c8f2c/pdfprogramm-en-data.pdf
101
The German Presidency of the EU Council declared in 2020, “Europe must bolster its digital sovereignty
to effectively respond to future challenges, guarantee livelihoods and ensure the security of its citizens.”
See Expanding the EU’s Digital Sovereignty, EU2020, https://www.eu2020.de/eu2020-en/eudigitalisation-technology-sovereignty/2352828.
102
See Alexandra V. Orlova, "Digital Sovereignty," Anonymity and Freedom of Expression: Russia's Fight
to Re-Shape Internet Governance, 26 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 225, 228 (2020).
103
See Jane Wakefield, Russia ’Successfully Tests’ Its Unplugged Internet, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50902496 (quoting Professor Alan Woodward as saying that
the Runet would keep Russian citizens “within their own bubble").
104
See Ksenia Koroleva et al., RuNet Law Comes Into Force: What Is Next, JDSUPRA (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/runet-law-comes-into-force-what-is-next-72937/.

“information warfare” waged by Western countries against the Russian government.105 One of
the goals of the Runet is to protect the Russian internet from “external negative influences.”106
Russia employs a common and highly controversial tactic for implementing digital
sovereignty: data localization.107 Law No. 242-FZ, which came into effect in 2015, requires data
operators to ensure that the recording, systematization, accumulation, storage,
update/amendment, and retrieval of personal data of citizens of the Russian Federation are
made using databases located in the Russian Federation.108 In 2015, a Russian court blocked
LinkedIn from the country for failure to localize data. In 2020, Russian regulators fined
Facebook, Google, and Twitter for refusing to store their data in Russia, with Facebook paying
the $53,000 penalty in 2021.109 In 2021, Russia’s internet regulator Roskomnadzor throttled
traffic to Twitter, after Twitter failed to delete posts urging children to take part in antigovernment protests.110 Roskomnadzor has also threatened to throttle Google’s traffic if it
refuses to localize data.111

105

Orlova, supra note 102, at 231.

See The Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications: Government Agencies and Telecom
Operators Are Ready to Ensure Stable Operation of the Runet, TASS (Dec. 23, 2019),

106

https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7407631.
For an argument that data localization both undermines domestic development and increases the power
of local authoritarians, see Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L. J. 677
(2015).
108
See Federal'nyy zakon No. 242-FZ ot 21 iyulya 2014 g. O vnesenii izmeneniy v nekotoryye
zakonodatel'nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v chasti, kasayushcheysya obnovleniya poryadka obrabotki
personal'nykh dannykh v informatsionno-telekommunikatsionnykh setyakh [Federal Law No. 242-FZ of
July 21, 2014 on Amending Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in as Much as It Concerns
Updating the Procedure for Personal Data Processing in Information-Telecommunication Networks],
FEDERAL'NYY ZAKON [FZ] [Federal Law] 2014, No. 242-FZ art. 18 § 5 (Rus.).
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See Adrian Shahbaz et al., Special Report 2020: User Privacy or Cyber Sovereignty?, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/user-privacy-or-cyber-sovereignty;
Facebook
Pays Russia $50K Fine For Not Localizing User Data, MOSCOW TIMES (Nov. 26, 2020),
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/11/26/facebook-pays-russia-50k-fine-for-not-localizing-userdata-a72152.
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See Madeline Roache, How Russia Is Stepping Up Its Campaign to Control the Internet, TIME (Apr. 1,
2021), https://time.com/5951834/russia-control-internet/.
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See Roskomnadzor Orders Twitter and Facebook to Localize Russian Users’ Data by July 1 , MEDUZA
(May 26, 2021), https://meduza.io/en/news/2021/05/26/roskomnadzor-orders-twitter-and-facebookto-localize-russian-users-data-by-july-1.
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E.

The United States: Digital Sovereignty by Default

One nation is more likely to criticize data sovereignty than to embrace it: the United
States. This is because the United States is in the unique position of being home to many of
the world’s leading technology firms. This means that during the ordinary course of regulating
its companies, the U.S. exercised data sovereignty from the start. The Federal Trade
Commission, for example, cited GeoCities for privacy failures as early as 1998.113
The dominance of American technology firms does not mean that the United States
has not faced controversies along the way. The first Digital Millennium Copyright Act
prosecution was strikingly brought against a Russian, who happened to be visiting the United
States for the Def Con conference in 2002.114 The United States accused the Russian
programmer of selling tools that broke through Adobe’s e-book security. Jennifer Granick, a
leading digital rights advocate, argued at the time that the U.S. should not impose its
interpretation of copyright law on foreign nations.115
In part because top level domain names are indexed on a domain name server in
Virginia, the United States government has routinely seized domain names of sites that violate
domestic law. Karen Kopel, writing in a student note in 2013, observes: “Since its inception over
two and a half years ago, [U.S. federal] Operation In Our Sites has seized 1,719 domain names
of which over 690 have been forfeited, ranging from websites selling allegedly counterfeit luxury
goods, sports memorabilia, and pharmaceuticals, to websites that host copyrighted music,
movies, TV shows, software, and websites that only link to this content.”116 But these
112

See Couture & Toupin, supra note 48, at 2313 (“Within the United States, digital sovereignty (or related
terms) usually have negative connotations across the political spectrum.”). For example, the US
Ambassador to the European Union, Anthony Gardner, cautioned the EU in 2015: “The calls from some
Member States, however, to promote so-called digital sovereignty, discriminatory regulation, or forced
data localization will not help Europe to maintain and extend its leadership in the global digital economy.”
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Expert Arrested at Def Con, CNET (Mar. 2, 2002), https://www.cnet.com/news/russian-crypto-expertarrested-at-def-con/.
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N.Y. Times (quoting Jennifer Granick as saying that the acquittal of the Russian company in the case
was “good for democracy: people in other countries can make determinations about what is right and
wrong for themselves.’”). See Matt Richtel, Russian Company Cleared of Illegal Software Sales, NY
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/business/technology-russian-companycleared-of-illegal-software-sales.html.
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Karen Kopel, Operation Seizing Our Sites: How the Federal Government Is Taking Domain Names
Without Prior Notice, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 859, 860 (2013).

enforcement actions, Kopel suggests, lack sufficient process and may infringe on First
Amendment concerns.117
The fact that the largest internet companies are based in the United States also means
that data about Americans is typically stored in the United States. This allows prosecutors to use
traditional judicial processes within the country to access the data, subject to Fourth
Amendment and statutory protections. But when U.S. prosecutors sought information stored
in Ireland on Microsoft servers, Microsoft protested that this was beyond the statutory authority
of prosecutors.118 Congress intervened to amend the law to grant authority to prosecutors to use
judicial process to require companies to produce data held abroad.119
But earlier enforcement efforts against internet enterprises do not seem to compare
with the regulatory demands that resound across the political spectrum in the United States. If
there ever was a laissez-faire era for U.S. internet regulation, 120 that era is distinctly over.121
At the same time, the U.S. government remains concerned that foreign efforts to assert
digital sovereignty can be a guise for old-fashioned protectionism. For example, the U.S.
government’s 2021 report on “foreign trade barriers” cites EU digital sovereignty practices as
possibly “unfairly target[ing] large U.S. service suppliers and hamper[ing] their ability to provide
innovative, Internet-based services in the EU.”122
F.

The Global South: Avoiding Data Colonialism

Even as access to the internet has grown dramatically,123 many governments in the
Global South worry about being left behind in the digital economy. Digitization, whether led
by foreign or domestic firms, has, of course, proven critical to their economic growth, giving
individuals information about markets and opportunities that was hard to obtain previously.
Yet, foreign companies have an outsized presence in their digital lives. Developing nations fear
recapitulating colonialism, specifically, of being both the raw materials (now in the form of data)
and markets for Western manufacture (in the form of processed information).
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In 2021, South Africa published a draft National Data and Cloud Policy that explicitly
seeks to “promote South Africa’s data sovereignty.”124 The draft policy laments that “data
generated in Africa and South Africa is mostly stored in foreign lands and, where stored locally,
is owned by international technology giant companies.”125 It seeks to reverse that through a data
localization mandate: “All data classified/identified as critical Information Infrastructure shall
be processed and stored within the borders of South Africa.” The draft policy also announces,
“Data generated in South Africa shall be the property of South Africa, regardless of where the
technology company is domiciled.”
In fact, in its recently released Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030),
the African Union envisions “data sovereignty” as one of its policy priorities.126 It too suggests
data localization as a strategy to promote data sovereignty: “Even though Africa is at the moment
less restrictive, soon it will be necessary to ensure localization of all personal data of Africa’s
citizens.”127 In Senegal, President Macky Sall hopes to “guarantee[] Senegalese digital
sovereignty” by building a data center within the country with the help of a Chinese loan and
Huawei equipment and technical assistance.128
After Twitter deleted a tweet by President Muhammadu Buhari that some saw as
threatening violent reprisal against protestors, the Nigerian government simply banned Twitter
from the country.129 In the battle between developing state and big tech, Nigeria shows that a
government willing to forgo a platform that it or its citizens use can still win. In the non-Western
parts of the world (including both developing countries and the former Soviet Bloc nations),
assertions of digital sovereignty are more likely to include shutdowns of a website or even the
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internet. This may be because government political censorship may be less likely to be complied
with by the foreign platforms.
Indigenous peoples are also seeking data sovereignty. Indigenous data sovereignty
“deals with the right and ability of tribes to develop their own systems for gathering and using
data and to influence the collection of data by external actors.”130 For example, the Māori Data
Sovereignty Network seeks to ensure that Māori peoples have sovereignty over the “data
produced by Māori or that is about Māori and the environments we have relationships with.”131
II.

How Digital Sovereignty Is Different

Digital sovereignty is not merely the assertion of sovereignty online. The last few
decades have taught us that the internet changes the nature of sovereignty in a variety of ways.
First, because of the global nature of the internet, digital sovereignty almost always has global
implications, whether it involves speech regulation, privacy, consumer protection, competition
concerns, or law enforcement; thus, digital sovereignty can create significant roadblocks to one
of the internet’s key virtues—its empowering of global connections. Second, because the digital
sphere is intermediated by corporations, the assertion of digital sovereignty typically occurs visà-vis corporations, not governments. Third, because our lives are increasingly permeated by the
internet, digital sovereignty can offer governments surveillance tools that far exceed any history
has previously provided. Fourth, because of the dominance of U.S. technology companies
globally, governments can readily weaponize digital sovereignty to serve protectionist goals.
A.

Always global

Unless one cuts off the local internet from the global internet (a possibility that China,
Iran, North Korea, and Russia are working towards in different measures), the regulation of the
internet almost inevitably involves foreign actors.132 Consider a French court’s order to Yahoo!
in 2000 to stop permitting French residents to access Nazi materials. Yahoo! responded by
banning these materials across the world.133 The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation
Christopher B. Chaney, Data Sovereignty and the Tribal Law and Order Act, 65-APR FED. LAW. 22, 23
(2018). See also Aila Hoss, Exploring Legal Issues in Tribal Public Health Data and Surveillance , 44 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 27, 38 (2019); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Data Governance and Informational Privacy:
Constructing “Indigenous Data Sovereignty,” 80 MONT. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (2019) (“Data sovereignty
describes the right of a nation to ‘govern the collection, ownership and application of data’ concerning
the tribe or its members and to control data that is housed within tribal territory.”).
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(GDPR) does not regulate the processing of personal information about a U.S. person in a
transaction in the United States, but yet Microsoft and numerous other companies have chosen
to apply at least parts of the GDPR to their practices worldwide.134 Anu Bradford labels this the
“Brussels Effect.”135 While David Johnson and David Post famously argued that the global
nature of the internet made any sovereign assertion illegitimate,136 Jack Goldsmith demonstrated
that inter-jurisdictional conflicts are not new with the internet, and that international law has
tools to manage them.137 Paul Berman goes further to argue that pluralist approaches to
governance should be normatively welcome as they better express contemporary conditions.
Digital sovereignty increasingly means regulating not one’s citizens alone, but also
foreigners, typically firms offering services across the world. In order for law to be meaningful
in a world of internet globalization, states must regulate foreign entities. It is this necessarily
extraterritorial138 exercise of jurisdiction that increases the difficulty, complexity, and risk of
digital sovereignty.
At the same time, excessive assertions of digital sovereignty can tear the internet apart,
relegating us all to national spaces for commerce and speech, where once we could transact and
speak across the world. The specter of the 193 nations of the United Nations, and other suband supra-national jurisdictions besides, regulating the internet at the same time seems daunting
indeed. Instead of the world’s most free speech zone, the internet may become the world’s most
unfree zone, a conglomeration of the censorship and rules of all the jurisdictions in the world.
B.

Against corporations

Where sovereignty has historically been asserted in relation to foreign states, digital
sovereignty is equally or perhaps more likely to be asserted against foreign corporations. Foreign
corporations are the ones that are dealing directly with their residents—collecting data, offering
services, and moderating speech. Jennifer Daskal observes that much of transnational internet
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governance “is largely being mediated by the private parties that hold and manage our data.” 139
“It is these companies that increasingly determine whose rules govern and, in key ways, how they
are interpreted and applied,” she writes. Writing about digital sovereignty, Lucien Floridi
observes, “The most visible clash is between companies and states.”140
Indeed, the European Parliament’s study of digital sovereignty explicitly rests its call for
digital sovereignty on this ground: “Strong concerns have been raised over the economic and
social influence of non-EU technology companies, which threatens EU citizens' control over
their personal data, and constrains both the growth of EU high-technology companies and the
ability of national and EU rule-makers to enforce their laws.”141 Much of the enforcement
activity under the GDPR is, accordingly, targeted at corporations. India worries that foreign
companies are benefiting from local data—the twenty-first century version of serving as the
source of raw materials for the manufacturers of the Global North.
C.

More control

As Neil Richards observes, “We are living in an age of surveillance. The same digital
technologies that have revolutionized our daily lives over the past three decades have also created
ever more detailed records about those lives.”142 Those digital technologies can be utilized by the
state. Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren worry about what they called “the invisible
handshake” between the government and corporations: “Whether the Big Brother we distrust is
government and its agencies, or multinational corporations, the emerging collaboration
between the two in the online environment produces the ultimate threat.”143
In Seeing Like a State, historian James C. Scott argues that increases in what he calls
“legibility” were a critical part of large governmental projects.144 Scott sees this legibility, when
combined with hubris, as leading to failed schemes—but increases in legibility could also lead to
greater control. The digital world enlarges governmental legibility dramatically, even more so
when the government gains access to information collected by private companies. The legibility
that internet companies seek into their users for commercial purposes145 can be exploited by the
state as well.
139
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Scott argues that mid-twentieth century failures of government planning resulted from
hubris, with the planners “forgetting that they were mortals and acting as if they were gods.”146
For Scott, the absence of representative institutions reduces resistance to these large planning
measures. Scott’s government planners were largely well-intentioned, with noble goals of a more
egalitarian society.147 We should be mindful that digital regulators, whether well-intentioned or
not, should not wield unchecked power. This will require both a vigorous civil society and laws
that are designed with appropriate checks for governmental abuse.
D.

Enables protectionism

When President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker proposed the
Digital Single Market policy in 2015, he focused on promoting European innovation—but not
through protectionist applications of regulation: “Today, we lay the groundwork for Europe's
digital future. I want to see pan-continental telecom networks, digital services that cross borders,
and a wave of innovative European start-ups.”148 Günther Oettinger, then a member of the
European Commission for Budget and Human Resources, explained that “The digital single
market can be a win-win” for both European and Silicon Valley firms.149 Andrus Ansip, the
European Commissioner for Digital Single Market from 2014-2019, similarly suggested, “The
digital single market "will provide opportunities for trade, investment, innovation not only for
Europe, but globally — also, for the United States.”150 Fredrik Persson, chairman of the
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise cautions that European efforts towards digital sovereignty
“should not create a European fortress that pulls up the drawbridge to the outside world.”151 In
March 2021, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen,
Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin sent a joint letter to
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen encouraging European efforts for digital
sovereignty but cautioning that the EU should avoid protectionist strategies to build digital
sovereignty: “Digital sovereignty is about building on our strengths and reducing our strategic
weaknesses, not about excluding others or taking a protectionist approach.”152 Many European
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leaders have explicitly disavowed protectionism, instead embracing the coexistence of foreign
and domestic technology companies.
Other voices within the European Union, however, portray issues of digital sovereignty
as a zero-sum geopolitical struggle. In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron declared,
“The battle we’re fighting is one of sovereignty.” He continued, “If we don’t build our own
champions in all new areas — digital, artificial intelligence — our choices … will be dictated by
others.”153 The European Parliament’s study of digital sovereignty echoes this: “EU policymakers have identified a potential dependence on foreign technology as presenting a risk to
Europe's influence.”154 Commissioner Thierry Breton declares that “European data will be used
for European companies in priority, for us to create value in Europe.”155
The European Parliament’s study goes on to argue that the dominance of foreign
internet platforms in the EU is itself a hallmark of the loss of European sovereignty. The study
explains: “[L]arge online platforms (mostly non-EU based) are increasingly seen as dominating
entire sectors of the EU economy and depriving EU Member States of their sovereignty in areas
such as copyright, data protection, taxation or transportation.” But this argument seems
misplaced. It is like arguing that because people drive Toyota cars on U.S. roads, we no longer
control our streets. As long as the cars are regulated by local law, the fact that they might be built
abroad should not undermine sovereignty.
Some see a zero-sum game with respect to the internet with winners and losers. In 2020,
Thierry Breton, the European Union’s Commissioner for Internal Market, expressed
confidence that EU companies would beat their American counterparts: “The winners of today
will not be the winners of tomorrow.”156 At times, however, the European approach to digital
sovereignty seems to be focused on replacing U.S. enterprises with European ones, a classic
protectionist strategy. Commissioner Breton seeks to ensure that “European data will be used
for European companies in priority, for us to create value in Europe.”157
Even while seeking to rein in the power of U.S. tech titans, some in the EU seem to
covet their own. In June 2021, “French President Emmanuel Macron announced the objective
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of having ‘10 companies worth €100 billion by 2030’ in Europe … after he received …
recommendations to encourage the emergence of digital giants in Europe.”158 Some in the EU
wish to create their own “European digital champions.”159 Regulatory actions in the digital space
are especially amenable to protectionist use because the largest players in the industry are often
foreign-owned corporations. Whether justified or not, some saw Facebook’s hand in the Trump
Administration’s targeting of largely Chinese-owned TikTok.160
III.

The Double-Edged Sword of Digital Sovereignty

Digital sovereignty can grant governments extensive powers over the companies that
collect unprecedented amounts of data over us. We examine here a number of ways in which
that power can lend itself to abuse. Even well-intentioned law—in the examples here designed
to protect against abusive speech, or to protect privacy or national security—can be prone to
abuse. We offer examples of this possibility below, noting that these rules can be implemented,
interpreted, or enforced in ways that favor powerful politicians.
As much as sovereignty is often necessary for democratic governance, it can also
immunize oppression. Louis Henkin acerbly noted that the “most common use of
the word ‘sovereignty’ may be in sovereign immunity--immunity from law, immunity from
scrutiny, immunity from justice.”161
This dual nature may explain what appears to be a double-standard in judging digital
sovereignty acts by different countries. That is, the same norm could be used to help ensure that
foreign companies protect the rights of local citizens, or it could be used to threaten those
foreign companies when they don’t follow the demands of an authoritarian government. For
example, when Russia passes a “grounding law” that requires internet companies with more
than 500,000 daily visitors to open offices in Russia,162 that seems distinctly more dangerous163
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than European Union obligations for maintaining a local representative.164 Even the Indian
government’s demand that Twitter appoint local grievance officers leaves open the possibility
of retaliation against sch officers for failure to abide government orders.165 The intermediary
rules requiring local grievance officers seem to have been instituted by Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s government following its displeasure with Twitter. 166
A.

Speech

NetzDG (Germany). Germany’s Network Enforcement Act of 2018 (popularly known
as “NetzDG”) requires social media companies with two million or more users to remove
“manifestly unlawful” speech within twenty-four hours after user complaint, with limited
exceptions. Repeat failures can lead to fines of up to 50 million euros. “In effect, the NetzDG
conscripts social media companies into governmental service as content regulators,” Diana Lee
writes.167 Germany’s broad criminal law related to speech makes this even more risky than it
might be elsewhere: “It can be a criminal offense in Germany to call another person a ‘jerk,’ or
even to use the informal du, or ‘thou,’” to communicate a lack of respect for the recipient,” Lee
notes, quoting research by James Whitman.168 NetzDG specifies 22 offences that require such
rapid deletion, including libel, defamation, sedition, and calls for violence. As Lee notes, “In
close cases, social media companies will likely err on the side of caution in order to avoid penalties
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under the NetzDG.”169 Many worry about the possibility of over-blocking content, given the
penalties for non-compliance with the takedown obligation.170
By requiring incredibly rapid takedowns, such laws “virtually require the use of upload
filters,” as Hannah Bloch-Wehba argues.171 Bloch-Wehba observes that automated content
moderation “preserv[es] the centralization and dominance of large technology companies,”
thereby making “surveillance cheaper and easier for law enforcement.”172 She worries that social
media companies will internalize the political goals of enforcers to avoid enforcement actions:
“Platforms adapt their content moderation rules and practices to conform to regulators'
preferences, both to comply and to avoid new regulations.”173 Annemarie Bridy elaborates,
worrying about the “troubling dynamic in which platform executives seek to appease
government actors—and thereby to avoid additional regulation—by suppressing speech in
accordance with the prevailing political winds.”174

Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited (European Union). Can an
internet company be liable if it refuses to remove a post calling a member of parliament a
“corrupt oaf” and a “fascist”?175 Possibly, according to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). An Austrian politician had sued Facebook because it had refused to remove a
post containing those offensive terms used against her. The case wound its way to the CJEU,
which held that the EU’s E-Commerce Directive176 did not preclude liability on Facebook’s part
for refusing to remove this content. The E-Commerce Directive provides protections for
“information society services.” Article 15 provides, in part: “Member States shall not impose a
general obligation on providers, when providing [information society services], to monitor the
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or
Id.
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circumstances indicating illegal activity.” Recital 47 of the E-Commerce Directive, however,
permits monitoring obligations in a specific case—such as the one in Glawischnig-Piesczek.177
The CJEU went further to conclude that the Austrian court could order the deletion of the
particular post, but also prevent any post with “words having equivalent meaning” across
Facebook sites “worldwide.”
The demand to remove posts “having equivalent meaning” across
Facebook
worldwide seems to require automated systems that are likely to produce significant errors.178
Even this Article might not pass such a filter! And the decision to allow an Austrian court to
order a global removal, in the context of criticism (warranted or not) of a politician, no less, will
embolden other states to demand the same. The assertion of Austrian law across the world seems
difficult to justify, even more so on matters involving political speech. The CJEU’s sustaining
of the Austrian court’s power to order the removal of the post would have been easier to defend
if it did not include all “equivalent” posts, and if it was limited to Austria (or perhaps the EU).
But the underlying law may make it difficult to call out politicians who are actually corrupt or
fascist—because of worries that they may sue.
At the same time, Facebook’s defense in the case that it was governed by either Irish law
(because of its European headquarters) or U.S. law (because of its global headquarters), but not
Austrian law, was itself an attack on Austrian digital sovereignty, which both Austria and the
CJEU properly rebuffed. After all, as long as speech law has not been harmonized across the
European Union, to subject Austrians to Irish speech law based on the jurisdictional choices of
Facebook would be to do an end-run around Austrian law.179
B.

Privacy

Justice Reform Act (France). In 2016, lawyer and machine learning expert, Michaël
Benesty, analyzed French asylum decisions by judge, revealing that some judges rejected almost
all asylum requests, while others accepted most.180 The study caused a furor in France, and led
to a law that criminalized any such studies, punishable by up to five years in prison.181 The
Felipe Romero Moreno, ‘Upload filters’ and human rights: implementing Article 17 of the Directive on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, INT’L REV. L., COMPUTERS & TECH., 34:2, 153, 154 (2020).
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new Article 33 of the Justice Reform Act reads: “No personally identifiable data concerning
judges or court clerks may be subject to any reuse with the purpose or result of evaluating,
analyzing or predicting their actual or supposed professional practices.” 182 Such a law makes it
more difficult to scrutinize the judicial process and to identify judges that might be hostile to
particular claims.

Data Protection/Didi (China). On June 30, 2021, Didi, the ride-hailing firm based in

Beijing, went public on the New York Stock Exchange.183 On July 2, the Cyberspace
Administration of China (“CAC”) announced a cybersecurity review of Didi, and on July 4, it
ordered the Didi app removed from Chinese app stores.184 The cybersecurity review was aimed
at “preventing national data security risks, maintaining national security and safeguarding
public interests.”185 CAC ordered the app removal because it found that the app was “illegally
collecting and using personal information.”186 For the cybersecurity review, the CAC relied on
the Cybersecurity Law of 2017 and the Measures on Cybersecurity Review issued thereunder
in 2020.
Chinese commentators explained the cybersecurity review as being motivated by the
“hypothetical scenario of the US coercing Chinese firms to submit data…, citing the US
government's track record of stopping at nothing to forcing businesses to surrender.”187 A
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson lent support to this concern, arguing that “it is the US
that forces companies to open ‘back doors’ and illegally obtain user data.”188 Zuo Xiaodong, the
vice-president of the China Information Security Research Institute similarly stated, “In the
listing process in the US, some important data and personal information held by Chinese
companies may be revealed due to the US regulation request.”189
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for-rule-breakers/. One British commentator observes that “the old law against ‘Scandalising the
Judiciary’ was only recently abolished in England & Wales, which shows that judges over here have not
always liked to be scrutinised too closely either.” Id.
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Seen from one angle, the concerns are similar to those expressed by the Court of Justice
of the European Union with respect to data transfers to the United States. After all, there the
European court cited Executive Order 12333, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence and
Surveillance Act, and Presidential Policy Directive 28 to argue that U.S. law did not sufficiently
protect the data of foreigners from American governmental surveillance.190 In that sense, the
Didi enforcement order could be seen as an effort to protect the personal data of Chinese
residents. But at the same time, the Didi enforcement effort, the first application of the
cybersecurity review, was also a warning to Chinese companies about who the boss is. In that
sense, the enforcement effort could be read, not as an intervention designed to protect Chinese
data—after all, personal information is typically not shared as part of any U.S. securities filing—
but rather a shot across the bow to multi-billion dollar companies to not tangle with regulators
in the future.
C.

National Security

TikTok Ban (United States). On July 31, 2020, President Donald Trump announced
on Air Force Trump that “as far as TikTok is concerned, we’re banning them from the U.S.”191
A flurry of executive orders would follow. On August 6, 2020, President Trump issued two
parallel executive orders targeting TikTok and another Chinese-owned app, WeChat,192
followed by another order requiring ByteDance, the Beijing-based owner of TikTok, to divest
its U.S. TikTok subsidiary following a national security review by the Committee on Foreign
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Investment in the United States (CFIUS).193 Through TikTok, the President argued, the
Chinese government could secretly compile compromising data about Americans, enabling
blackmail.194 The Trump Administration seemed to be relying on a frighteningly broad
provision of the Chinese National Intelligence Law, Article 7, which states that “any
organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according
to law.” The Trump Administration also argued that the Chinese government would use the
app to censor American speech or to disseminate propaganda. TikTok had indeed been caught
suspending an American teenager who cleverly used an eyelash tutorial to criticize the Chinese
government’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims.195 Facing a furor, TikTok apologized for what it
described as an error and restored her account. Since that time, posts with the hashtag #uyghur
have garnered 82.5 million views on the app.196
President Trump announced the TikTok ban some three months before the election,
pointing his fingers at an alleged insidious foreign plan to infiltrate the United States. But when
federal courts saw the government’s secret evidence against TikTok, they sided with TikTok,
preliminarily enjoining the TikTok and WeChat bans.197 Judge Carl Nichols, a Trump
appointee to the federal bench, halted the TikTok ban despite the government’s claims that it
posed a national security threat.198 In a second case, Judge Wendy Beetlestone declared the
government’s concerns “hypothetical.”199 Notably, the CFIUS divestiture order, however, was
neither challenged, nor enforced.
The national security rationales conveniently justified actions that targeted a platform
that had proved particularly troublesome to the President.200 Trump borrowed even more of the
Pres. Proc. No. 10,061, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,295 (ordering ByteDance to divest all of its rights and interests
in any assets or property used to enable or support the operation of TikTok in the United States, and “any
data obtained or derived from TikTok or Music.ly application users in the United States” within 90
days.).
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authoritarian internet playbook than might be obvious: like authoritarians everywhere, he
sought to silence his critics. TikTok, after all, was the one massive social media platform in the
U.S that he had not mastered. If he had banned Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube, he would have
lost a channel to reach millions of his followers directly.201
In 2021, a new President would revoke the TikTok and WeChat bans, ordering instead
a broad review of access to United States’ persons sensitive data by foreign adversaries.202 He said
that such a review would be based on “rigorous, evidence-based analysis and should address any
unacceptable or undue risks consistent with overall national security, foreign policy, and
economic objectives, including the preservation and demonstration of America’s core values
and fundamental freedoms.”203 Coupling the rescission of the prior order with this statement
suggests that the earlier executive orders failed to meet those standards.
The failure of the TikTok ban is a sign of healthy checks and balances, but the fact that
it occurred shows that such checks and balances are necessary. The willingness of federal courts
to refuse to meekly accept the President’s claim of a national security emergency is heartening.
This is also a story of a Congress that had anticipated abuses; courts that enjoined the TikTok
and WeChat bans relied in part on the fact that Congress had provided protections for speech
from the otherwise broad emergency economic powers that Congress granted to the
President.204
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ban-tik-tok. Under this theory, the WeChat ban would be merely collateral damage, as it would be odd to
target TikTok without also banning this other popular Chinese-owned app.
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NSO Spyware for Hire (Israel). In July 2021, Amnesty International revealed that some

50,000 individuals in more than 45 countries—including fourteen heads of state205 and
numerous journalists—were the target of phone hacking, using software sold by the NSO
Group.206 For example, an “investigation suggests the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán
appears to have deployed NSO’s technology as part of his so-called war on the media, targeting
investigative journalists in the country as well as the close circle of one of Hungary’s few
independent media executives.”207
NSO is hardly the only Western company implicated in the sale of repressive
technologies. The Israeli company Cellebrite has been implicated in oppression by governments
across the world, but still is planning an IPO in New York. 208 Its IPO prospectus warns investors
that its “solutions may be used by customers in a way that is, or that is perceived to be,
incompatible with human rights.”209 Another Israeli “hacking-for-hire” firm, Candiru, has
“helped government clients spy on more than 100 victims around the world, including
politicians, dissidents, human rights activists, embassy workers and journalists,” at least
according to Microsoft.210 The Israeli company Verint Systems reportedly sold spying tools to
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Azerbaijan that were used to identify its citizens’ sexual orientations through Facebook, and to
Indonesia to collect personal information about LGBT rights activists.211
This is not a problem of Israeli exporters alone. In 2015, the Italian company, Hacking
Team, was itself hacked, revealing an extensive client list in authoritarian governments,
including governments and security services of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.212 The U.S. networking equipment company Sandvine
reportedly supplied an Internet-blocking technology to Belarus that was used to block access to
websites and repress protests during the 2020 Belarussian elections.213 Furthermore, NSO’s
exports themselves implicate the laws of EU member states Bulgaria and Cyprus, as NSO exports
its products from those countries as well.214
Western commentators rightly point out that Chinese technology companies often sell
their technologies to repressive governments across Africa and elsewhere. They go on to
distinguish a liberal Western approach to technology from a repressive Chinese approach.215 But
why use Chinese surveillance technology when you can buy Western technology that will get
the job done?216 And this argument seems to forget that it was Western companies that helped
build China’s Great Firewall of China in the first instance.217
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Israeli law requires exports of such spyware to be approved by its Defense Department,
and NSO claims to have received the necessary permits.218 The NSO spyware scandal reveals the
importance of governments regulating not only foreign companies, but also domestic
companies, to ensure that these companies do not help infringe human rights elsewhere. A
former Cellebrite employee notes that other employees would justify the sales on the ground
that “governments could buy the same services from China, therefore better that we sell it to
them instead.”219 But this reasoning would allow one to sell the most deadly services in the world,
as long as someone else was selling them too. Furthermore, buying surveillance services from a
democratic country may draw less scrutiny than buying services from companies in
authoritarian states. Finally, the argument ignores the possibility of jointly pressuring foreign
governments to stop permitting their companies to sell such services in the global markets.
Conclusion
On May 15, 2000, French plaintiffs accused internet pioneer Yahoo! of American
imperialism because Yahoo.com made Nazi materials accessible to people across the world.220
Yahoo!’s lawyers responded that to apply French law to a site based in the U.S. more closely
resembled French imperialism.221 The French court carefully tailored its order to only require
Yahoo! to desist from providing the prohibited materials within France. Today, countries across
the world have adopted the French position to insist that foreign companies comply with local
law, at least on matters significant to them.222
A quarter of century after the birth of the global internet, neither the libertarian wishes
of early internet pioneers nor the globalist desire for a single global community have prevailed.
Instead, we see increasing efforts by the countries of the world to gain control over the internet.
This is understandable. As Andrew Woods observes, “states remain the single greatest source of
legitimate rules for different peoples with varied community values and experiences on a diverse
planet.”223 Digital sovereignty is simultaneously necessary and scary—necessary to ensure that
ordinary laws follow us as we move increasingly online, disciplining the corporations that govern
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our work, school, and private lives—but scary because regulation of the internet gives
governments even more power to invade broader spheres of our lives. Just as the power wielded
by digital corporations must be carefully regulated, so must the power of digital regulators.
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